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# STUDY PROJECT

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## INTEGRATION OF THE WAR ON DRUGS COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, AND INTELLIGENCE

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL EDWARD C. NORMAN

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) Integration of the War on Drugs-Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED Individual
7. AUTHOR(s) LTC Edward C. Norman		6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS U.S. Army War College Carlisle Bks, PA 17013-5050		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
		12. REPORT DATE 9Apr89
		13. NUMBER OF PAGES 69
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office)		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) Unclass
		15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.		
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)		
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) With the passage of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 and the Fiscal Year (FY) 1989 National Defense Authorization Act the Department of Defense (DOD) and armed services were tasked to support the President's War on Drugs. This study examines the employment of military power to support the Command, Control, Communication, and Intelligence (C3I) in a multi-organizational effort. The study finds what civil-military organization appears best able to support unity of effort in the war on drugs and.		

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INTEGRATION OF THE WAR ON DRUGS  
COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, AND INTELLIGENCE

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

Lieutenant Colonel Edward C. Norman, IN

Colonel David G. Hansen  
Project Advisor



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U.S. Army War College  
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania  
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Justification	
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Distribution /	
Availability Codes	
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A-1	

## ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Edward C. Norman, LTC, IN

TITLE: Integration of the War on Drugs-Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence

FORMAT: Individual Study Project

DATE: 9 April 1989 PAGES: 64 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

With the passage of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 and the Fiscal Year (FY) 1989 National Defense Authorization Act the Department of Defense (DoD) and armed services were tasked to support the President's War on Drugs. This study examines the employment of military power to support the Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C3I) in a multi-organizational effort. The study finds what civil-military organization appears best able to support unity of effort in the war on drugs and integrate assets dedicated to drug interdiction into an effective communications network. The study concludes that national leaders and Congress must declare a national emergency and employ the Federal Emergency Management Agency to support the National Drug Policy Director and DoD in executing the war on drugs C3I tasking successfully.

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INTEGRATION OF THE WAR ON DRUGS  
COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This study analyzes how Department of Defense (DoD), can most effectively manage military responsibility for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C3I) in support of the "War on Drugs". Currently, no congruent civil-military C3I organization orchestrates the nation's multi-organizational civil-military effort.

The study evaluates existing and proposed organizational relationships in light of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 and Fiscal Year (FY) 1989 National Defense Authorization Act. It proposes a civil-military organizational architecture to accomplish the Congressionally mandated military support of the President's War on Drugs.

## POLICY AND BACKGROUND

### War and Policy

"Policy, of course, will not extend its influence to operational details. Political considerations do not determine the posting of guards or the employment of patrols. But they are the more influential in the planning of war, of the campaign, and often even the battle".<sup>1</sup>

The FY 1989 DoD Authorization Act makes DoD the single lead agency of the Federal government for detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States; integration of U.S. command, control, communications and technical intelligence assets dedicated to drug interdiction into an effective communications network; and approval and funding state governors' plans for expanded use of the National Guard in support of drug enforcement activities while in a state status under Title 32 of the United States Code.<sup>2</sup>

The Anti-Drug Act of 1988, containing 10 Titles, emphasizes demand reduction and the enforcement of user accountability in domestic drug abuse. The act establishes an Office of National Drug Control Policy and gives its director, the new "Drug Czar", extensive powers of oversight over federal counter-drug programs. The Director will serve as a coordinator for the National Counter-Drug Strategy. Unfortunately, the act reflects numerous compromises between the House and Senate, which has



yielded several "Sense of the Congress" resolutions, rather than specific directives. Such resolutions are not binding in nature. Congress did determine that the Director should receive and review agency budgets before Office of Management and Budget (OMB) consideration. This represents a House preference, which precludes the Director from setting policies and fixing budgets. In effect we have been legislated a "Toothless Giant" with no ability to put the bite on the power -- money.

The abyss between the Omnibus Drug Bill and the 1989 DoD Authorization Act defines the vortex of the C3I problem. The military has been tasked to take charge of a civil-military action for specific purposes; and the civilian organization has not been placed under any responsive central control. A military solution to a civilian concern has little opportunity of success unless the effort, if not the command, is unified.

The only common area the law does address is Data Collection. The states are to cooperate in providing data to the Federal Government in response to a standardized data requirement. However, there is no agreement on the profile of the target(s) or on what information should be gathered.


The 1988 Anti-Drug Act is the forty-first legislative action directed at the United States drug problem. The 1988 act, in effect abolishes existing Command, Control,

Communications, and Intelligence organizations and establishes a coordinated National Drug Policy requirement.

Current federal counter-drug organizations comply with the 1986 Omnibus Drug Act. These are The National Drug Enforcement Policy Board (NDPB), National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NIMBIS) C3I, and The White House Office of Drug Abuse Policy organization. These existing organizations will be terminated on the 30th day after the first director is confirmed by the Senate in accordance with the 1988 Anti-Drug Abuse Act.<sup>3</sup>

The 1988 law establishes the "Office of National Drug Control Policy". This organization serves in the Executive Office of the President and is composed of a Director ("Czar"), a Deputy Director for Demand Reduction, a Deputy Director for Supply Reduction, and an Associate Director for State and Local Affairs.<sup>4</sup> This organization is illustrated at FIGURE 1. The Act confirms the Secretary of State as the Department authorized to establish international narcotics programs and coordination of all international narcotics assistance programs.

FIGURE 1.



SOURCE: CONGRESSIONAL RECORD H 11110  
DATED OCT 21, 1988. SEC. 1001.

Continuity and unity of command continue to be a nemesis of our national war on drugs. For example, a realistic concern is maintenance and establishment of continuity of civil-military operations in the transition between the old and new organizations. This issue was addressed to LTG Olmstead, who heads the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Personnel ASD(F&MP) Drug Task Force. He commented, during an interview on 30 Nov 1988, that the second echelon of the existing organizations will carry the transition actions forward. However, he also indicated there was no formal transition plan to support Congress's latest directions.<sup>5</sup>

On the other hand, the 1988 Anti-Drug Abuse Act improved our capability to support the congressional tasking regarding Intelligence. Under Section 1007, "The director of Central Intelligence shall, to the fullest extent possible [in accordance with The National Security Act of 1947] render full assistance and support to the Office of National Drug Control Policy and its Director."<sup>6</sup>

#### MISSION AND CONCEPT

The Secretary of Defense is responsible for developing a comprehensive detection and monitoring plan for all borders of the United States. This narrowly stated mission does not address

what is critical for successful execution of military operations. The critical resource is the existence and use of a communication net to disseminate integrated information in support of the mission. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff is assigned responsibility to conduct operations to detect and monitor aircraft and maritime vessels suspected of smuggling illegal drugs into the United States. Operationally, DoD will organize on a regional basis and assign military commanders responsibility for operations within their specified areas. This role is similar to those traditional DoD activities that use and manage intelligence and sensor detection information to develop a composite collection strategy that supports the requirements of the operational commanders."

#### SITUATION

Following election of Vice President Bush to the presidency, he announced on 13 January 1989 that he would appoint Mr. William Bennett, former Education Secretary, as Drug Czar."

The DoD planning is being accomplished through the time sensitive (Crisis Action) Joint Operational Planning System. Responsible commanders and supported agencies have been identified, assigned missions, and tasked to begin a phased interaction with drug law enforcement agencies (LEA)."

### GOVERNMENT INSTABILITY

The Nation's drug interdiction efforts suffer from a lack of clear direction. <sup>10</sup>

The war on drugs is ten years old. The United States has tried the LEAs, established The Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), designated a Vice President as leader of the war on drugs, activated a National Drug Policy Board under the Attorney General, mounted a "Just Say No" campaign, and finally appointed a Drug "Czar". The sad story is there has been no consistent program under a singularly responsible agency or person. No chain of command works unless the commander is designated and has the responsibility, authority, and resources to accomplish the assigned mission.

The Congress shall have Power...To declare War...To raise and support Armies...To make rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval forces....<sup>11</sup>

Where as the issue is not necessarily a Declaration of War, the issue does come down to Congressional responsibility for invoking the role of the military in the war on drugs. There is no clear indication, other than providing C3I military support, of what Congress really expects the military to accomplish. They have not designated DoD to be the single lead

government agency in charge of executing this war, yet DoD is to integrate the functions normally associated with a commander. Congress in communication with the military, must determine what the outcome will be. If Congress's intent is to place the DoD in a defacto role as the commander in a defacto war, then the other federal agencies must be given a clear indication they will be in a specified supporting role to DoD and DoS outside the United States. The military will be in a supporting role inside the United States. Or conversely, if it is Congress's intent that Mr. Bennett assume a command role then he should be identified more like an Assistant Secretary of Defense "overseeing" the drug war. What we need now is clarification of "Who will Command?" and stability in terms of "Unity of Effort" from congress, not an Drug Bill "Pork" Barrel Polka!

The war on drugs has been called a National Emergency. This should not be a figurative reference; rather it should become the basis for invoking the provisions of Executive Order 11490,<sup>12</sup> which designates approximately fifty federal departments and agencies with emergency mobilization responsibilities. The coordinating agency is The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). FEMA has the responsibility and authority in both peace and war to support national emergency planning and operations within the United States.

Thus FEMA has a range of involvement from Civil Defense to Natural Disaster Assistance; it has a direct interface office at the DoD level in JCS, the Director of Military Support (DOMS). Why not make the existing civil-military system work? Why are we supporting the establishment of yet another civil-military bureaucracy? Mobilize and execute the war on drugs as a national emergency. Use FEMA to integrate the DoD effort within the Continental United States (CONUS), our "Near" and "Rear" battle, and to coordinate support for DoD Commanders in Charge (CINCs). Assign Department of State (DoS) responsibility outside CONUS in our "Deep" battle.

#### THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR

Today's Army recognizes the following principles of war: Objective, Offensive, Mass, Economy of Force, Maneuver, Unity of Command, Security, Surprise, and Simplicity. <sup>12</sup>

These principles have been used within this discourse as a guide for analysis. They are used in to this analysis to tie the C3I for the drug war to existing Army Doctrine. They thus provide a frame of reference. The basic conclusion is that the majority, if not all of the principles of war have been violated both by civilian agencies and DoD. This doctrinal finding



provides the logic for the concluding recommendations in this chapter.

### CONCLUSIONS

There is no clear chain of command for DoD organizations to relate to. There is no consolidated civil-military organization to integrate the DoD, federal, state, and local efforts in the war on drugs. The FEMA responsibility for the coordination of civil-military efforts in Command and Control (C2) should be considered as a viable command resource for the war on drugs. There is a duplication of effort between the Assistant Secretaries of Defense and the operational Joint Staff elements i.e. ASD(F&MP), J3 and J3 C3I.

These policy and operational inconsistencies, violations of the principles of war, and federal agency's overlapping responsibilities contribute to dysfunctional civil and military lines of responsibilities and missions. Currently, prosecution of this war is a violation of our DoD organizational doctrine and is inconsistent with establishing an effective C3I program in accordance with established organizational procedures published in JCS Pub 2. Either DoD senior leadership should, as legally and morally provided for, clarify the task Congress has

assigned. Or they should recommend a structural response to clarify the issue and offer a possible resolution. The illustrative organizational issues and recommendations, addressed next, support that objective.

#### ENDNOTES

1. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, p. 606.
2. Policy Guidelines For Implementation for FY 1989 Congressionally Mandated DoD Counter-Drug Responsibilities, Memorandum, OASD. Force Management and Personnel, 8 Nov. 1988, p. 1.
3. "Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988" Section 1002, Congressional Record, 21 October 1988, p. H11110.
4. Ibid., Section 1002, p. H11112.
5. Interview with LTG Steven Olmstead, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Personnel ASD(FM&P), 30 Nov 1988.
6. "Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988" Section 1007. Congressional Record, 21 October 1988. p. 11247.
7. Department of Defense Report To Congress, (Draft), Section IV para. A, as required by the 1986 Omnibus Drug Act, dated 1 Jan 1989, p. 19.
8. Scripps Howard, "Bush holds first session with Cabinet", The Patriot (Harrisburg, Pa.), 13 Jan 1989, p. 1.
9. Policy Guidelines For Implementation for FY 1989 Congressionally Mandated DoD Counter-Drug Responsibilities, Memorandum, OASD. Force Management and Personnel, 8 Nov. 1988, p. 1.

10. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, The Border War on Drugs, OTA-O-336, (Washington, DC USGPO), March 1987. p.52.

11. U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 8.

12. U.S. Laws, Statutes, etc., United States Code, sec. 3500 & 8500, para., 331, 332, and 333.

13. U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5, Operations, p. 173-175.

## CHAPTER II

### ORGANIZATIONAL ISSUES AND RECOMMENDED ACTIONS

Even in the unique Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) like environment that has been associated with the war on drugs, doctrinal issues are relevant. Accordingly this analysis has been based on the principles of war, especially on how Command and Control and Intelligence functions should be carried out across the spectrum of conflict. Such analysis does not assume, however, the drug war is conventional warfare.

#### Command and Control

Command and Control is the glue that holds together all elements of combat and political power; it resides in the commander's domain. Command and Control (C2) is operational and facilitates authority and direction. External C2 factors include geography, threat, mission/objective, and forces associated with global political factors.

How much C2 doctrine is applicable to the war on drugs? Is Unity of Command essential? or Unity of Effort? They are not always the same. If unity of effort is achieved, unity of command may not be essential.

"The ultimate measure of command and control effectiveness is whether the force functions more effectively and more quickly than the enemy."<sup>1</sup>

During his January 20, 1988 Inaugural Address President Bush spoke of the drug issue, noting "We as a society must rise up and unite and express our intolerance.... There is much to be done. But take my word: This scourge will stop."<sup>2</sup>

In terms of much to be done, one of the first orders of business is to deconflict responsibilities within the DoD. To date we have Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Personnel ASD(F&MP), Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict ASD(SOLIC), Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs ASD(RA), Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I ASD (C3I) and The Communications Interoperability Working Group (CIWG) of the NDPB Science and Technology Committee headed by LTG Olmstead of the ASD(F&MP) Task Force on Drugs, and CJCS all in charge, or trying to be in charge, of some portion of the DoD effort in the execution of the FY 89 National Defense Authorization Act drug taskings. The most recent example of these conflicting roles is provided in a January 6, 1989 Deputy Secretary of Defense (William H. Taft, IV) policy letter. This apparent "Transition" document, attached as Appendix 1, provides devastating evidence

of the bureaucratic morass within DoD. Two examples follow:

"My [Mr. Taft's] principle staff assistant and advisor for policy, requirements, priorities, systems, resources and programs ...is ASD(F&MP)." 3

"Within the framework of ASD(F&MP) management oversight, the ASD (C3I) will coordinate C3I matters and ASD(RA) will coordinate National Guard matters. ASD(F&MP) responsibilities include recommending overall direction for DoD implementation of the legislation by establishing policy guidelines for the DoD counter-drug support resources, based on advice and assistance from OSD principles, CJCS, Service Secretaries and Defense Agencies." 4

Deputy Secretary Taft is clearly struggling for means to organize the DoD effort. However, the guidance contained in Chapter 1 of JCS PUB 2 has been overlooked. "Effective use of the military power of the Nation requires that the efforts of the separate Military Services be closely integrated.

a. Unity of effort among the Military Services at the national level is obtained by the authority of the President and the Secretary of Defense exercised through the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by the strategic planning and direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and by common, joint, and cross-Service efforts by the Military Departments." 5

The bottom line is the DoD leadership (Deputy Secretary of Defense and ASD(F&MP)) appears to have violated our Joint Military doctrine by intervening in the realm of JCS, which is confusing the issue of centralized command: Who is in charge?

"For every objective, ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander"4

Command and Control provides the system to manage information. The functions of command and control address the assessment of the situation, including the current status of an organization in accomplishing a designated task, deciding on the need for additional actions or changes, and projecting future requirements. These managerial processes lead to determination of actions and the resulting issuance of planning guidance and proposed courses of action. In turn subordinate forces prepare plans and orders, coordinate for support, and accomplish specific tactical missions.

Unfortunately, current evidence appears to indicate there is both a lack of Command and Control and Unity of Effort in America's war on drugs.

#### Command and Control Actions

The recommended organizational changes to improve the

nation's civil-military ability to engage in a successful war on drugs is focused on the strategic and operational level.

It is Congress's responsibility to direct the employment of the military in support of National Objectives. They should do so and support the related impacts. Congress must bear the responsibility of creating (through the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 and the FY 1989 National Defense Authorization Act), an impossible setting for the effective employment of the military. At a minimum a Declaration of National Emergency should be issued to support the military's role in the President's Congressionally supported war on drugs. A logical near term step to resolve the war on drug's Command and Control problem from the federal to state level, within the borders of the United States, would be to place the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) under the direct control of the new National Drug Policy Director. This expanded use of FEMA could result in the integration of the civil-military effort through all federal agencies and the DoD system in CONUS under the provisions of Executive Order 11490.

The manpower and equipment is in place. The Military Support to Civil Defense (MSCD) contingency has been resourced with some manpower and equipment by both the military and civilian agencies. This infrastructure is now ready to use.



The suggested strategic use of FEMA, presented by this study, could be enhanced by the use of the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS) to defend our "Near" and "Rear" areas of operation. The current NNBIS regional areas and centers are shown at FIGURE 2. These geographic boundaries complement the FEMA MSCD planning boundaries, which generally parallel the Continental United States Army Command (CONUSA) boundaries. This consolidation should realize efficiencies of scale in terms of manpower, facilities and communications systems.

We should be using this organization both for the war on drugs and also to improve our defense of CONUS contingency plan.

# NATIONAL NARCOTICS BORDER INTERDICTION SYSTEM

## REGIONAL AREAS AND CENTERS




FIGURE 2.

### Unity of Command and Effort

The current national war on drugs organization does not place civilian government agencies under a single office for control and integration of effort except the office of the president. The National Director of Drug Policy Control has no direct authority over the other federal agencies.


This should be corrected by three basic actions. First, if The President does not include the Director on the NSC as authorized by congress, he should designate a National Drug Coordination Committee (NDCC) composed of the Director for National Drug Policy Control "Drug Czar", The National Security Advisor, SECDEF, SECSTATE, DoE, HHS and The Attorney General. The members of the NDCC will be responsible for the coordination of the President's war on drugs both domestically and outside CONUS. Unresolved issues will be presented to the President by the National Security Advisor.

Second, Congress should revise the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 by the reducing of the Congressional "Oversight" relationship to the Office of the President. Overly close oversight relationship does not appear to support the principle of Unity of Command. Congress already confirms the appointment of the Director of National Drug Policy, the Deputies and Associate as well. The most logical alternative would be to

exercise Congressional Oversight through the NDCC. This should not violate the normal relationship between the president and appointed members of the cabinet. The impact of not implementing this recommendation is that Congress has in fact assumed the role of "Drug Czar". If this is their intent, then Congress should eliminate the National Director and the supporting organization.

Lastly, Congress should direct all federal agencies, other than the Department of Defense, to be subordinate to the National Director for Drug Policy Control for the specific purpose of the war on drugs. Congress should authorize "by line budget" authority under the direct control of the Director's office. Thus congress will control, through the Director, the funding to support the war on drugs. Implementation of these recommendations will allow the President, through a NDCC (assuming the Director of National Drug Policy Control (DNDPC) is appointed as a special member of the NSC), to direct the strategic employment of national resources to prosecute the federal war on drugs without duplication of effort and funding. These recommendations support the principle of unity of command and unity of effort at the strategic level. See FIGURE 3.

FIGURE 3.



**SOURCE: CONGRESSIONAL RECORD H 11110  
DATED OCT 21, 1988. SEC. 1001.**

## Integration

Why integrate? Congress recently directed the military to eliminate duplication through legislating more "Jointness" between the services. The drug war needs some "Jointness" too. In one related example of duplication the US Customs Service, using congressionally authorized funds, has awarded GE Government Services (Cherryhill, NJ) a \$51.3 million dollar contract for four aerostat systems for use in detecting low-flying aircraft and surface vessels suspected of transporting illegal drugs into the US.<sup>7</sup> This is only one of many examples where congress and authorized federal agencies are duplicating DoD equipment procurement programs for fighting the war on drugs. The worst part of these stories in a declining budget environment is that the manpower to support these systems more times than not come "Out of Hide", reducing the number of on-the-street federal drug war combatants. It makes sense to integrate all the programs and resources possible especially with forty-one different agencies included in federal funding. To accomplish this task, a single agency or office must be designated to coordinate the effort. The problem is not a small task to resolve. The military is tasked to support between twelve and fourteen civilian players in the United States government sector:

00 DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

- Federal Bureau of Investigation
- Drug Enforcement Administration
- US Marshals Service
- Immigration and Naturalization Service
- US Border Patrol

00 DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY

- US Customs Service
- US Secret Service
- Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms

00 DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

- US Coast Guard
- Federal Aviation Administration

00 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

00 DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR

For the efforts of this cast of players to be directed toward a single mission, that mission must be led by a clearly identified chief or boss. This has been accomplished in a similar, one of a kind, organization which is responsible by Presidential direction for Federal Emergency Management. This precedent should be followed if we expect to integrate our "Warfighting" efforts. The alternative is to have a continuing in-house power and turf struggle between various civil-military

agencies.

The grease of integration is power. In Washington D.C. "Power" is spelled money. The new Drug Czar must be given budget authority over all counter-drug programs, or the President may wish to consider invoking a national emergency and directing the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to be directly responsible to the Director to arbitrate critical resources. This civil integration of effort will consolidate requirements for DoD to respond to with Military Support. Someone has to police the battlefield and Congressional legislation can't do that job on a day to day basis. This is the third major reason for considering the role of FEMA in the war on drugs.

Once an integrating organization is established, a coordinated National Long Range Plan for applying pressure on major smuggling modes at ports of entry and air, marine, and land borders can be prosecuted through a civil-military strategy. This would entail matching resources to the present threat and developing a system to eliminate duplication of effort. This will result in Unity of Effort generated by synergism of a single command regulating civil-military actions between DoD, the National Drug Policy Director, and agencies subordinate to FEMA. That synergism sets in place the common planning framework to include networks for intelligence and surveillance data to support designated commands and areas.



Currently available technologies are capable of supporting such an organization, once it is identified and liaison personnel are exchanged between civil and military organizations. A large portion of this type of structure could be supported, in the near term, by using the existing FEMA infrastructure of personnel and equipment in each government agency.


#### Integration of Military Support to Civilian Agencies

The integration of military support to civilian agencies at the CONUS operational (state and local) level can be effected by designating a representative General Officer from The National Guard Bureau or the JCS Directorate of Military Support (DOMS) to support the National Associate Director for the National Drug Policy Bureau for State and Local Affairs. This will not change the wartime relationship of the National Guard to the Active Component forces. Rather, it would enhance the peacetime integration of effort between DoD and the various states to expedite policy for the employment of National Guard forces in support to both federal and state/local agencies.

Within the DoD the following changes should be made. All actions requiring DoD support will be directed by the President through the SECDEF and CJCS for execution by the Joint Staff J3

and Warfighting CINCs. The President will direct the USCG to be placed under the Operational Command (OPCOM) of DoD for all drug-related actions. The Department of Transportation will retain responsibility for non drug related functions of the USCG. The Offices of Assistant Secretaries of Defense involved in Drug Policy and Enforcement will be disestablished. All functions will be tasked to the Joint Staff (JCS), Services, and CINCs as appropriate. The National Guard Bureau will function within the Army Staff (ARSTAF) as the coordinating agency responsible for integrating the employment of National Guard resources in support of either federal or state/local requirements. The Bureau will be the approving agency for the submission of the respective Governor's Plan for employment of the National Guard within each state. Further, it will be the issuing agent for requisite funding as authorized by congress. See FIGURE 4.

FIGURE 4.



\* USCG DPCDM

- - - COORDINATION/INFO/INTELL

- H - CIVIL MILITARY COORD/INTELL

- O - O - COORDINATION OF TITLE 10 AND 32


## Intelligence

By "intelligence" we mean every sort of information about the enemy and his country---the basis, in short, of our own plans and operations.<sup>8</sup>

Intelligence is the key to the drug war enigma. The task is to establish an architecture for all theaters -- Deep, Near and Rear. This action, combined with a coherent strategy, will support the effort to improve collection, build CINC specific corporate data bases, and target integration facilities for each theater. The overall objective will be to support the commanders with real-time intelligence for use by both the military and civilian sectors. This can be accomplished -- but not without significant change in the way we do business. This aspect of the war on drugs cannot be "Business as Usual".

The framework depicted at FIGURE 5 is an Office of Technology Assessment illustration of how intelligence interfaces with the Command and Control tasks to support interdiction functions. The idea is basic and well thought out. However, there are major issues to be resolved. A fundamental one is National Security Agency (NSA) concerns over public knowledge of classification techniques used within various DoD agencies. The scheme focuses on implementation of the Computer Security Act of 1988.<sup>9</sup>

FIGURE 5.



SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1987.

This bill (approved January 1988) transfers the primary responsibility for this type of security to the Commerce Department's National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). NSA contends any encryption and decoding techniques impacting on DoD place at risk the primary means for protection of information stored in government computers. Precisely this type of bureaucratic hedging could strangle a proactive intelligence campaign in support of the war on drugs. A limited access program must be established between the military and civilian agencies.

Existing intelligence efforts should be integrated -- and not only with DoD, but throughout the agencies supporting the war on drugs. The DEA's tactical intelligence is maintained by the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC),<sup>10</sup> until disestablishment by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988. EPIC shares information with NNBIS and other interested agencies, which maintain their own centers. For example, the Customs Service and Coast Guard each maintain and operate their own joint C3I centers. This obviously creates problems in sharing time-sensitive information. How critical is this kind of sharing? During a recent field visit, members of the United States Army War College (USAWC) Senior Service College Fellows program were on board a USCG aircraft during a drug interdiction patrol near

Florida. As the patrol ended, the USCG aircraft was returning to home base when they received an interdiction/intercept mission. In the process of executing this mission they entered a restricted air corridor. The tasking C3I center had failed to inform the appropriate military control center. The USCG aircraft was detected and advised it would be shot down if it did not leave the area. Needless to say, by the time this confusion had been resolved the suspect aircraft had successfully evaded the USCG efforts.<sup>11</sup> There is no excuse for the duplication of effort between military and civilian intelligence agencies and LEAs. To simplify matters, they should consolidate efforts and exchange liaison personnel and equipment if required to safely support a coalition effort in the war on drugs. The principle of "Security" must be applied in this case through integration and use of existing secure communication lines. By all means, interagency rivalry, characterized by turf battles and unnecessary clashes among wounded egos, must be minimized.

#### Intelligence Actions

The President's Intelligence Oversight Board (PIOB) should be constituted to enforce the integration of Federal Agencies

data and LEAs. The most important intelligence function is to inform or communicate the data in a near real time manner to the Command and Control organizations for action. This can best be accomplished by using the existing DoD and FEMA channels within the United States and CINC, and DoS channels outside CONUS as appropriate.

### Communications

Effective drug interdiction requires the capability for rapid information exchange and reliable, secure, and quick command and control of operational units. <sup>12</sup>

To consolidate resources and surprise smugglers, a communications system must be established between both the civilian and military sector. The evolutionary National Telecommunications Master Plan, under the stewardship of ASD(F&MP), will provide a excellent long term solution. However, in the interim period why can't we use the existing FEMA and supporting FORSCOM/CONUSA Emergency Single Side Band Radio Communication Nets and manual encryption tables used to coordinate Military Support to Civil Defense and Mobilization exercises with? This national resource is in place and ties in each state office of emergency services, which has operation




centers co-located with the state police and Army National Guard Headquarters in each state. This would support communications within CONUS. The "Deep" Theater communications net should use the existing CINCs and DoS systems.

#### Communications Action

A large portion of the near term CONUS communications functions to support integrated civil-military efforts in the war on drugs could be accomplished by using the existing FEMA infrastructure of personnel and equipment in each government agency. See FIGURES 4 AND 6.

FIGURE 6.



**SOURCE: CONGRESSIONAL RECORD H 11110  
DATED OCT 21, 1988. SEC. 1001.**

## ENDNOTES

1. U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5. Operations. p. 22.
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3. Policy Guidelines For Implementation of FY 1989 Congressionally Mandated DoD Counter-drug Responsibilities. Memorandum, OSD, Force Management and Personnel, 6 Jan. 1989, p.1.
4. Ibid.
5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff. Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), JCS Pub 2, 1 December 1968 (Washington: GPO, 1986) p. 1-1.
6. FM 100-5, p. 175.
7. "EC Monitor", Journal of Electronic Defense, November 1988, p. 62.
8. Clausewitz, pp. 117.
9. George Leopold, "Agencies at Odds Over Encryption Standards", The Defense News (Washington, DC), 26 September 1988. p. 3.
10. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, The Border War on Drugs. p. 4.
11. Interview with LTC Darald R. Stebner, Senior Service Fellow, USAWC, JFK School of Government, Carlisle, Pa., Dec 1988.
12. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessement, The Border War on Drugs, March 1987, p. 43.

## CHAPTER III

### CONFLICTING MISSIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

One of the most fundamental tasks the military plans to accomplish before entering combat is to "Organize for Battle". This chapter is designed to show the same requirement exists in the drug war. An alphabet soup of Federal agencies is involved in the war on drugs. Most of them have multiple responsibilities in addition to the ones associated with drugs. This phantasmagoria of organizations leads to fragmentation of mission execution and duplication of responsibilities. The following finding from the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment paints a grim picture.

"4. Responsibilities of the Federal drug interdiction agencies are fragmented and overlapping. The lack of suitable institutional framework is a major impediment to the adoption and effective use of technologies, particularly command and control systems that could offer significant benefits. With the exception of special intensive operations, problems with interagency coordination and cooperation occur and no central authority addresses important strategic questions on priorities and resource allocation."

Fragmented command, control, and jurisdictional responsibilities must be the first serious issue resolved by organizational alignment at the national level.

The following descriptions characterize the existing conflicting missions and responsibilities of the nation's "Drug Busters"

### Drug Enforcement Agency

The Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) was activated in 1973 to be the lead federal agency in the war on drugs. As a division of the Department of Justice, it is responsible for drug violations, which is its only mission. The DEA coordinates actions between all federal and state agencies. In addition, the agency functions in over forty-two countries in support of interdiction, intelligence activities and investigation efforts. DEA operations focus on convictions. This conflicts with other agency goals. For example, Customs and USCG focus on interdiction.

### Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is the chief law enforcement agent of the Federal Government. In 1982 the FBI was designated by the Attorney General to have concurrent jurisdiction with DEA for overall drug enforcement responsibilities. This makes both DEA and the FBI jointly responsible for the enforcement of the Controlled Substance Act. The overlapping responsibilities and competition between agencies for resources result in confusion for all LEAs. The issue of competition raises a question for the military: Which agency receives priority for assistance? There is a need for a civilian priority setting procedure if the military is to provide assistance from limited DoD resources.

### Coast Guard

The United States Coast Guard (USCG) concentrates available resources on the interdiction of drugs on and above the open seas. This is true for both sea and air platforms. The USCG has limited platforms to dedicate to this effort while carrying out its other Department of Transportation responsibilities. To a degree the USCG and U.S. Custom Service are duplicating efforts in the conduct of near shore patrols. The USCG has recently started developing its own intelligence capability. This appears to duplicate both the DEA and existing DoD programs.

The Coast Guard's most visible areas of employment are in the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico. The importance of this mission area is unquestionable. But why is the Coast Guard executing missions in the Commander in Chief of the Atlantic (CINCLANT) and North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) areas of responsibility? The most recent explanation is there was no specific tasking to the respective CINCs until the December 1988 JCS "Warning Order" was released. This may result in review, if not redress, of existing priorities and areas of responsibilities in the war on drugs.

### Customs Service

The Customs Service is responsible for three basic missions. They interdict drugs arriving through ports of entry (both sea and air,) and on vessels in the costal waters of the United States, up to the 12 mile limit. Each of these missions is assigned to a separate customs unit. There is a conflict of responsibility between the USCG in the air and on the seas. Customs and the Immigration and Naturalization Service duplicate efforts in the performance of some drug enforcement missions at ports-of-entry. The Custom Service's "Air" Branch has over 100 aircraft; 23 are specially equipped for air interdiction. The air interdiction effort is a coordination nightmare among the Federal Aviation Agency (FAA), NORAD, and a variety of DoD, state, and local agencies.

### Border Patrol

The Border Patrol has taken over the primary responsibility for interdiction of drugs at the U.S. border between the ports-of-entry, which are under the Immigration and Naturalization Service in the Department of Justice. The DEA has granted formal authority to the Border Patrol to perform missions in support of the war on drugs. This has recently

resulted in the employment of National Guard personnel to assist the Border patrol in conducting drug searches at border crossings.

#### Other Supporting Agencies

The primary players in the war on drugs are listed above. There are others in the "Near" and "Rear" Battle. They include The Internal Revenue Service, The Federal Aviation Agency, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms; the U.S. Marshals Service; and state and local LEAs. The "Deep" Battle includes some of the same forces, such as DEA, DoD, DoT, DoS and Host Nations. The issues remain the same: conflicting responsibilities and missions.

There is no overall coordinating C3I structure to resolve these issues. The various agencies are all dedicated to a good cause; but so far, they are unwilling or unable to react against the enemy and apply such principles of war as "Mass" and "Economy of Force". The enemy is able to act and react quicker than the agencies are. The Office of Technology Assessment report confirms this observation:

"5. Lack of overall direction that would establish a comprehensive approach to planning and operations, limits the effectiveness of interdiction programs. Improved direction could enable:

--enforcement resources to be allocated to the highest priority problem;



--the various agencies to design and carry out more effective coordinated interdiction strategies; and  
--the effectiveness of interdiction programs to be evaluated."<sup>2</sup>

It is time to organize the battlefield. Without a functional C3I organization, the nation's war on drugs will fail.

#### ENDNOTES

1. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, The Border War on Drugs, OTA-O-336, (Washington, DC USGPO), March 1987, p.3.
2. Ibid., p. 4.

## CHAPTER IV

### DECONFLICTED MISSIONS

#### The Commanders in Chiefs (CINCS) "Deep" Battle

The existing CINC areas of responsibilities (See FIGURE 7) will remain in effect. The relationship between the military, U.S. civil agencies and nations within a CINCS area of responsibility will be the responsibility of the Department of State (DoS). All requests for military assistance will be forwarded to the respective CINC for consideration. The CINC will advise DoS through JCS; and the respective U.S. Ambassador will be informed, providing approval or disapproval of military support requests. Area Clearance Authority, issued by the CINC's, for Civilian Agencies to enter into operations within a CINCS area of responsibility will be required. All civilian drug related Area Clearances will be coordinated, in advance, by the DoS through DoD.

The Commanders in Chiefs (CINCS) should be allowed to carry out the functions and actions in support of the war on drugs as they would in any other military support role. Military Advisory Groups (MAGs) in each country should process requests and information. DoD needs to establish "Joint" fusion centers in the area of responsibility and exchange liaison personnel with adjacent CINCS.

Let the State Department do their job. DoS should coordinate the use of civil-military agencies in a Host Nation. The use of "Direct Actions" is the Department of Defense's business, unless the CIA is involved. Even so, the principal agencies must coordinate to avoid duplication of effort or Jeopardizing each others operatives and missions.

The use of DEA and FBI should be carefully integrated with DoD and DoS outside the United States. Integration will be facilitated by the CINC, who should establish regional or country joint civil-military Task Force Headquarters composed of all participating agencies.

# Commanders' Areas of Responsibility





FIGURE 7.

### The "Near" and "Rear" Battle

A civil-military strategy of "Canalization" of the flow of illegal drugs into the "Near" Battle Area, defined as the CONUS Defensive Border Belt (2-5 miles deep inside the border out to the 200 mile point), and "Rear" Battle Area, inside the CONUS Defensive Border Belt (CDBB), allows operational forces to be assigned specific sectors of responsibility.

Starting from the inside out, the sectors could be assigned as areas of responsibility to various agencies. (See Figure 8) Each state will have primary responsibility inside the defensive border belt. State, local, and (as required) federal LEAs will coordinate operations in accordance with existing procedures. All requests for military assistance will be processed from the local and regional levels to the State Police, co-located with the State Offices of Emergency Services. Each State's Office of Emergency Services (OES) maintains a continuous operations center as required by FEMA. This facility has established communication facilities and liaison locations for all federal and state agencies, including the State National Guard Headquarters.



In turn, military requests can be supported, or forwarded through the CONUSA headquarters to Forces Command (FORSCOM) and DoD. Secure communications and intelligence billets are located at most major military units of all services within CONUS. These resources can facilitate integration of intelligence and communications functions of command and control of military support to civilian agencies. This same concept will be used for interior states without adjoining borders or oceans.

Within the Continental United States (CONUS), FORSCOM should be designated as the responsible CINC to coordinate the employment of Active forces made available, NORAD, and the Reserve Components in a Title 10 Status. CINCLANT, CINCPAC and FORSCOM should be designated as both supporting and supported CINCs to integrate efforts from the "High" water mark of CONUS out to the 200 mile limit. The USCG will have primary responsibility out to the 200 mile mark for seaborne operations. This concept is consistent with the Maritime Defense Zone (MARDEZ) contingency plan. In peacetime, the MARDEZ commanders (Naval or USCG) are responsible for coastal defense planning and training. In wartime, they will conduct defensive operations to ensure the security of ports and coastal approaches out to 200 miles of shore. There should be no difference in the war on drugs. Training in peace as we fight in war is a good practice.

U.S. Customs services and state/local LEAs will concentrate on seaborne operations in state and local waters. The CONUS based USAF will have responsibility for all Air Interdiction operations internal to the USA out to the 200 mile mark.

This concept is consistent with a Unified Command, FORSCOM, role in planning and execution of Military Support to Civil Defense plans (MSCD), Military Support to Civilian Agency (MSCA) Plans, Military Support to Maintain Postal Service (GRAPHIC HAND), Garden Plot Plans and the Defense of CONUS.

Custom Services will have primary responsibility for all air and sea ports of entry. The Border Patrol will have primary responsibility for all border-crossing points. The other supporting agencies (DEA, ATF, U.S. Marshall, IRS agents etc.) will perform their primary functions and establish a general support, reinforcing Quick Reaction Force (QRF) in each NNBIS region.

This proposal for making the alphabet soup nourish the drug war is, of course, only tentative. The political complexity and military infrastructure may well prevent such a drastic solution. The "Ideal" must be tempered by reality. But a workable C3I organizational structure is a realistic requirement to win the war on drugs. We should not wait another ten years and risk another generation of Americans while organizing for



the battle. A national emergency requires drastic action. There can be no "Business as Usual" in war.

Is "The War on Drugs" -- "A Mission Impossible?" Only if we make it one by failing to integrate our capabilities in a unified effort. Congress has left organizational and strategic gaps that must be filled in. The DoD can integrate, in conjunction with FEMA, the critical resources and provide a vast array of military support to achieve such a National Objective under the direction of the National Drug Policy Director.

## CHAPTER V

### CONCLUSION

The strategic integration and unity of effort for civil-military organizations in the war on drugs is the center of gravity for the DoD C3I application of military power. The assignment of responsibilities and dedication of national intelligence gathering assets can be effective "Ways" and "Means" for DoD to support the national drug strategy. However, the military element of power will only be effective when the political object of victory is defined by Congress in terms of desired "Ends". When this is accomplished, the objective can be reached by employment of existing civil-military organizations structured to address national emergencies i.e. NCA, OSD, JCS J3, CINCs, and FEMA. These organizations, under the direction of the National Drug Policy Director, can be victorious. Winning the war on drugs is not "A Mission Impossible".

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9. Taft, William H., IV. Memorandum, Office, Secretary of Defense, Policy Guidelines For Implementation of FY 1989 Congressionally Mandated DoD Counter-Drug Responsibilities, Washington, DC: 6 January 1989.
10. U.S. Congress. House. Congressional Record. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988. Section 1002. H. Record 1988, 100th Cong. 2d Sess. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1988.
11. U.S. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment. The Border War on Drugs. 100th Cong., 1st Sess. Washington: USGPO, 1987.
12. U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 8.

13. U.S. Department of Defense. Report to Congress 1 January 1989. (Draft), Washington, DC: January 1989.

14. U.S. Department of the Army. Field Manual 100-5: Operations: Washington: 1986.

15. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. JCS Pub 2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF). Washington: DC: 1 December 1968.

16. U.S. Laws, Statutes. etc. United States Code. 1968 ed. Washington: USGPO, 1968. sec. 3500, & 8500.

APPENDIX 1

VERBATIM EXTRACT FROM DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE POLICY  
GUIDELINES FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF FY 1989 POLICY  
MANDATED DoD COUNTERDRUG RESPONSIBILITIES



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

January 6, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS  
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING  
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
COMPTROLLER  
GENERAL COUNSEL  
INSPECTOR GENERAL  
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION  
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT  
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES

SUBJECT: Policy Guidelines for Implementation of FY 1989  
Congressionally Mandated DoD Counterdrug  
Responsibilities


The FY 1989 DoD Authorization Act assigned DoD responsibility to serve as the single lead agency of the Federal government for detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States; to integrate U.S. command, control, communications, and technical intelligence assets dedicated to drug interdiction into an effective communications network; and to approve and fund state governors' plans for expanded use of the National Guard in support of drug enforcement activities while in State Status under Title 32. My principal staff assistant and advisor for policy, requirements, priorities, systems, resources, and programs for these new responsibilities is the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Personnel (ASD(FM&P)), and a new directorate has been established within ASD(FM&P) to manage the added functions. Within the framework of ASD(FM&P) management oversight, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (ASD(C3I)) will coordinate C3I matters, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (ASD(RA)) will coordinate National Guard matters. ASD(FM&P) responsibilities include recommending overall direction for DoD implementation of the legislation by establishing policy guidelines for the DoD counterdrug role and recommending the distribution of counterdrug support resources, based on advice and assistance from OSD principals, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Service Secretaries, and Defense Agencies. The attached policy guidelines provide the requisite direction for implementing the new tasks.

Within the framework of the policy guidelines, CJCS will be responsible for developing the necessary plans and overseeing

operations, for defining organizational responsibilities for implementing the lead-agency mission for detection and monitoring of the aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States, and for performing other functions specified in DoD Directive 5100.1.

ASD(FM&P) will be responsible for managing the development of a plan for integration of the U.S. command, control, communications, and technical intelligence assets dedicated to drug interdiction into an effective communications network. This effort will be effected within the framework of the National Drug Policy Board (NDPB)-approved National Telecommunications Master Plan for Drug Enforcement (NTMPDE), whose purpose is to ensure interoperable communications among the Federal, state, and local agencies engaged in interdiction and apprehension of drug traffickers, and other drug enforcement-related efforts. The Communications Interoperability Working Group (CIWG) of the NDPB Science and Technology Committee is responsible to the NDPB for oversight and implementation of the NTMPDE, to include the interdiction subset. ASD(C<sup>3</sup>I) will be responsible for coordinating technical development and implementation of the communications network and will provide the required communications technical support and advice to the CIWG. The Defense Communications Agency will support ASD(C<sup>3</sup>I) to ensure effective and efficient implementation of communications requirements identified by OSD. CJCS will define the communications infrastructure necessary to support the DoD detection and monitoring mission and will coordinate as necessary to ensure interoperability with other integration efforts. ASD(FM&P) will be responsible for coordinating the efforts of ASD(C<sup>3</sup>I) with the Service Secretaries, CJCS, appropriate Defense Agencies, and civil activities. Coordination external to DoD will be implemented through the CIWG of the NDPB Science and Technology Committee.

ASD(FM&P) will be responsible for coordinating the efforts of ASD(RA), the Service Secretaries, the CJCS, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, and OSD principals in soliciting, reviewing, approving, and recommending funding of state governors' plans for expanded use of the National Guard in drug enforcement activities while in State Status under Title 32.

  
William H. Taft, IV  
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Attachment:  
As Stated

## DOD COUNTERDRUG POLICY GUIDELINES

I. **PURPOSE.** To establish policy guidelines for fulfillment of DoD's counterdrug responsibilities described in Title XI of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1989.

II. **DOD RESPONSIBILITIES.** The FY 1989 National Defense Authorization Act assigned DoD responsibilities to serve as the single lead agency of the Federal government for detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States; to integrate U.S. command, control, communications, and technical intelligence assets dedicated to drug interdiction into an effective communications network; and to approve and fund state governors' plans for expanded use of the National Guard in support of drug interdiction while in State Status under Title 32.

### III. DEFINITION OF TERMS.

A. Lead Agency for Detection and Monitoring. The agency with the authority to require consultation among all agencies involved. It will develop, coordinate, and implement detection and monitoring plans. It is responsible for integrating the total detection and monitoring program.

B. Surveillance. The systematic observation of aerospace, surface, or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means.

C. Detect. To determine the presence of aircraft or vessels suspected of attempting to introduce illegal drugs into the United States.

D. Monitor. To track, electronically or otherwise, a suspect aircraft or vessel. Generally, DoD monitoring ends when law enforcement assets are suitably positioned to assume responsibility.

E. Intercept. To establish a position relative to vessels or aircraft from which activities of the intercepted vehicle can be monitored visually or electronically from the intercepting platform.

F. Pursue. To continue to monitor a suspect aircraft or vessel after it enters the land area of the United States.



#### IV. STATUTORY FACTORS.

A. Military Preparedness. Support to interdiction of drug importation is only one aspect of the national defense mission. Therefore, no support will be provided to any law enforcement official if to provide such support would adversely affect the military preparedness of the United States. However, since support for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States is now part of DoD's national defense mission, such support may be provided without adherence to the "substantially equivalent training" requirement.

B. Interception or Pursuit by Aircraft Operated by DoD Personnel. DoD personnel may operate aircraft to intercept or pursue suspect aircraft and vessels for the purpose of communicating with them to direct them to go to a location designated by appropriate law enforcement officials. The interception or pursuit may continue over the land area or over or into the internal waters of the United States if detection began outside the land area of the United States.

C. Interception or Pursuit by Vessels Operated by DoD Personnel with Law Enforcement Detachments (LEDETs) On Board. This legislation does not alter the statutes, regulations, and interagency operating agreements which govern the operations of vessels which have LEDETs on board.

D. Interception or Pursuit by Vessels Operated Exclusively by DoD Personnel. Vessels operated exclusively by DoD personnel may intercept or pursue suspect vessels or aircraft for the purpose of communicating with them to direct their movement to a location designated by appropriate law enforcement officials. If detection begins outside the land area of the United States, the interception or pursuit may continue as the prosecuting vessel or the suspect vessel or aircraft moves into or over the territorial seas, internal waters, or the land area of the United States.

E. Direct Participation in Searches, Seizures, or Arrests. Statutory restrictions prohibit direct participation by a member of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps in searches, seizures, or arrests. This prohibition includes members of the National Guard during the time they are federalized.

F. Providing Information to Law Enforcement Agencies. Any member of the Armed Forces who, in the normal course of military

training or operations, collects information relevant to a violation of civilian drug law will take steps to report it promptly to law enforcement officials. To the maximum extent consistent with national security, intelligence information held by DoD and relevant to drug interdiction or other law enforcement matters will be promptly provided to appropriate law enforcement officials. The needs of law enforcement authorities for information shall, to the maximum extent practicable, be taken into account in the planning and execution of military training and operations.

G. Participation in Drug Law Enforcement Activities. When made available to assist law enforcement agencies, DoD personnel may operate equipment for the following purposes:

1. Detection, monitoring, and communication of the movement of air and sea traffic;
2. Aerial reconnaissance;
3. Facilitation of communications in connection with law enforcement activities; and
4. Interception of vessels or aircraft detected outside the land area of the United States.

## V. **PROCESS FRAMEWORK.**

A. Single Lead Agency of the Federal Government for Detection and Monitoring of Aerial and Maritime Transit of Illegal Drugs into the United States.

1. Interdiction Process. The interdiction process (see chart 1) involves the grouping of interoperable functions and activities from law enforcement agencies and DoD. Some of these activities are dedicated to the interdiction process, and others perform one or more missions in addition to interdiction. The detection and monitoring mission is a part of this process. The primary functions making up the process are:

a. Target Development and Collection Management and Coordination. This function should make the best use of available civil and military tracking sensors, foreign and domestic intelligence, law enforcement information, etc. to provide the material for correlation. The objective is to produce value targets in a usable

form for the command nodes. Additionally, feedback from this information correlation can be used to improve a collection strategy of the sensors, both dedicated and multimission. The effective and efficient management and coordination of a robust mix of sensors would provide for increased performance and allow for optimal coverage within the constraints of sensor availability. This function encompasses the detection and monitoring mission.

b. Interdiction and Apprehension Command and Control (C2). This function entails a law enforcement node responsible for planning and executing the employment of interdiction and apprehension assets. In the majority of cases, these assets are multimission and are used for purposes in addition to counternarcotics. The command node is responsible for selecting from these limited interdiction and apprehension assets and determining how and against which target they will be employed. Execution of this responsibility is most dependent on good target information. The command and control function for target development and collection management and coordination and that for interdiction and apprehension are distinct functions of a larger process (interdiction) and must interoperate to ensure a cohesive overall effort.

c. Communications. Communications provide the supporting framework for the execution of detection and monitoring and law enforcement C2 of interdiction and apprehension as well as the necessary interoperation of these functions. There are essentially two communications subsystems necessary to perform the complete interdiction process (see chart 2). First is the detection and monitoring communications infrastructure subsystem. It would network data from the sensors to the processing facilities and the tasking data from the facilities back to the sensors, and provide connectivity with other intelligence and information sources. The product would be the development of target information that is responsive to the needs of the law enforcement C2 node. Second is the law enforcement C2 communications subsystem. It would provide interoperable, secure connectivity between command centers and interdiction and apprehension assets of multiple law enforcement agencies and their source of information and targeting support. In both cases, secure interoperability throughout the subsystems and between the subsystems will be required. The division of responsibilities between the two communications subsystems is as discussed in paragraph V. B., below. The interdiction communications network will become an integral part of and will have to interoperate with other elements of the National Telecommunications Master Plan for Drug Enforcement.

2. Proper DoD and Law Enforcement Agency Roles in the Process. The target development and collection management and collection coordination functions are most appropriate for DoD participation. The command and employment of interdiction and apprehension assets are law enforcement functions.

3. General Guidelines. DoD efforts for accomplishing its detection and monitoring lead-agency mission should:

a. Build on existing capabilities and facilities and avoid unnecessary duplication and expenditure of resources.

b. Seek to employ DoD resources in a manner which most enhances their traditional mission capabilities.

c. To the maximum extent practical, limit participation, infrastructure modifications, and system and asset procurement that will be dedicated to unique antidrug activities.

d. Result in an expansion over previous DoD detection efforts.

e. Include the development of a comprehensive detection and monitoring plan for all borders of the United States. This plan should ensure a cohesive detection and monitoring effort while accounting for the distinctiveness of the interdiction problems associated with the various border regions (Southeast, Southwest, Pacific, Northern, and Atlantic). The plan should include strategies and subplans as necessary and appropriate implementation schedules.

f. Include an evaluation of existing relevant DoD programs. The evaluation should include recommendations for program adjustments which would facilitate a substantial improvement in the detection and monitoring effort per dollar invested or diverted.

g. DoD will coordinate all air and sea detection and monitoring activities of the Federal government related to drug interdiction. DoD will raise unresolved interagency issues to the National Drug Policy Board (NDPB) or its successor organization. DoD shall ensure centralized control at the appropriate level of tactical resources committed to detection and monitoring operations. This centralized control will provide authority for local direction of movements and maneuvers for purposes of efficiency and safety. Each

agency will retain all other functions of command, including authority over organization, administration, and logistics.

4. DoD Components' Fundamental Responsibilities.

Secretary of Defense, OSD, Military Department, CJCS, JCS, Defense Agency, and Field Activity organizational relationships, functions, responsibilities, and procedures shall be as specified in DoD Directives 5100.1 and 5138.1. The principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense on counternarcotics matters is the ASD(FM&P). Other key staff assistants and advisors to the Secretary of Defense on counternarcotics matters--notably the ASD(C3I) and the ASD(RA)--will function under the management direction of the ASD(FM&P).


5. DoD Functional Responsibilities. The ASD(FM&P) will provide necessary additional policy guidance, coordination, and oversight of the appropriated \$300 million for accomplishing the detection and monitoring mission. ASD(C3I) shall provide DoD intelligence policy. CJCS will be responsible for development of operational plans, including assessment of force levels and appropriate levels of operating resources, to perform the detection and monitoring mission. Implementation will be accomplished through the Unified and Specified Command structure as designated by CJCS. ASD(FM&P) will maintain cognizance over necessary coordination with law enforcement agencies at the national level, to include development of any written agreements necessary to clarify relationships between DoD and law enforcement agencies. Appropriate regional and local coordination is encouraged.

B. Integration of U.S. Command, Control, Communications, and Technical Intelligence Assets Dedicated to Drug Interdiction into an Effective Communications Network. The primary goal is to provide appropriate secure, interoperable communications connectivity among military and federal civilian activities involved in and supporting drug interdiction. ASD(FM&P), with technical support from ASD(C3I), will coordinate the development of a plan for drug interdiction communications connectivity which is within the context of the National Drug Policy Board-approved National Telecommunications Master Plan for Drug Enforcement. This Master Plan provides the communications framework for all drug enforcement functions, to include the interdiction process and its law enforcement C2 and detection and monitoring subsystems. The communications infrastructure to support the DoD detection and monitoring lead-agency role will be a function of CJCS operations plans. Coordination between

the CJCS and ASD(FM&P) will ensure that this detection and monitoring network will be capable of secure, interoperable interface with the law enforcement communications network. ASD(FM&P) will be responsible for coordinating ASD(C3I) communications integration planning efforts with the Communications Interoperability Working Group (CIWG) and other appropriate national-level civil authorities. ASD(C3I) will provide DoD technical support and assistance as necessary to implement the coordinated communications network plan. CIWG, with ASD(C3I) support, will also provide a funding plan which will be reviewed and implemented through ASD(FM&P).

C. Expanded Role of the National Guard in Support of Drug Interdiction. This process involves a review and approval of proposed plans provided by the States. States will effect regional coordination of plans with appropriate law enforcement agencies and Regional Directors of the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS). The National Guard Bureau will solicit and evaluate proposed plans, coordinate those plans with applicable Military Department(s), and forward them with appropriate recommendations to ASD(RA). ASD(RA) will coordinate the plans with appropriate OSD principals and the CJCS and forward the plans to ASD(FM&P). ASD(FM&P) will consult with the Attorney General and submit the proposed plans to the Secretary of Defense with recommendations for approval and funding.

# THE INTERDICTION PROCESS



# COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT SYSTEMS

